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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under
the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)0) (2008). Pursuant to its authority
under Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court
transferred this case to the Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE / STANDARD OF REVIEW1
1. Where undisputed facts establish that an island of unincorporated property
would result from a petition to disconnect, did the district court correctly enter summary
judgment dismissing the petition under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503 (2001) and UTAH
CODE ANN. § 10-2-502.7(2003).
Standard of review:
correctness.

This Court should review the District Court's decision for

See MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 2006 UT 25, %9, 134 P.3d

1116 (stating that a matter of "statutory interpretation [is] a question of law . . .
review[ed] on appeal for correctness" and that legal conclusions of the district court on
summary judgment are reviewed "for correctness" (further citations omitted)); see also
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, L.C. v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, f26, 167 P.3d 1016.
Issue Preserved at: [R. at 793-798, 1110-1112.]

1

Appellee City of Cedar Hills ("Cedar Hills") notes that while Appellants identified four
separate issues for review, they failed to identify the standard of review for each issue
and failed to provide a "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the
trial court." Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(5)(A).
4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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RELEVANT STATUTES
2001 Version of the Disconnection Statute
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will leave the
municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements,
or other burdens of municipal services would materially increase over previous years or
for which it would become economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a
municipality.
(2) In making that determination, the commissioners shall consider all relevant facts,
including, but not limited to, the effect of the disconnection on:
* * *

(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large or varied-shapes peninsular land masses
result within or project into the boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is
to be disconnected.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503 (2001). (The full text of Section 10-2-503 is included in the
Addendum at Tab 1.)
***

(4) Considering all the evidence and the commissioners' report, the court shall order
disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria in section 10-2-503.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-505 (2001). The full text of Section 10-2-505 is included in the
Addendum at Tab 2.)
2003 Version of the Disconnection Statute
(1) After the filing of a petition under Section 10-2-502.5 and a response to the petition,
the court shall, upon request of a party or upon its own motion, conduct a court hearing.
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence regarding the viability of the
disconnection proposal.
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence:

4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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(a) the viability of the disconnection;
(b) that justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the
municipality;
(c) that the proposed disconnection will not:
(i) leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which the
cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal services would
materially increase over previous years;
(ii) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to
continue to function as a municipality; or
(iii) leave or create
unincorporated territory; and

one or more islands

or peninsulas

of

(d) that the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is
capable, in a cost-effective manner and without materially increasing the county's costs
of providing municipal services, of providing to the area the services that the
municipality will no longer provide to the area due to the disconnection.
#*#

UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-502.7 (2003) (emphasis added). (The full text of Section 10-2502.7 is included in the Addendum at Tab 3.

4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This appeal arises out of a petition for disconnection filed by David and Dixie

Harvey (collectively the "Harveys") on August 8, 2001. [R. at 1-7.] The material facts
are not in dispute. The Harveys do not dispute that their petition would result in an
unincorporated island of approximately 12 acres projecting into Cedar Hills. [R. at 1112.
Brief of Appellant at 13.] The single issue on appeal is whether the District Court
properly held that unincorporated islands are prohibited under both the 2001 and 2003
versions of the Utah disconnection statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-2-501 et seq.
("Disconnection Statute"). The Disconnection Statute has existed in substantially the
same form since 1972. The Disconnection Statute was most recently amended in 2003
(approximately two years after the Harveys filed their petition for disconnection). The
Harveys do not dispute that under the 2003 version, their petition is prohibited. [R. at
1106.] Before the District Court, the Harveys asserted that the 2001 version of the
Disconnection Statute governs and that under the 2001 version unincorporated islands, of
themselves, are not prohibited. The District Court held that unincorporated islands are
prohibited under either the 2001 or 2003 versions of the Disconnection Statute and the
Harvey's petition must be summarily dismissed. [R. at 1111.]
II.

Course of Proceedings
The Harveys filed for disconnection in the Fourth Judicial District Court in 2001.

[R. at 1-7.]

Cedar Hills filed a motion for summary judgment on June 8, 2006,

challenging the Harveys' petition for disconnection. [R. at 231-38.] The Harveys filed a
4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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counter-motion for partial summary judgment arguing that unincorporated islands are
prohibited under the 2003 version of the disconnection statute but not the 2001 version
and that their disconnection petition should be permitted. [R. at 750.] In a culmination
of the cross motions for summary judgment, the Court heard oral argument on April 4,
2008. [R. at 1122.] After hearing argument from both parties, the District Court ordered
summary judgment in favor of the City, determining that both the 2001 and 2003
versions of the disconnection statute prohibit such unincorporated islands. [Order dated
June 3, 2008, R. at 1112.] (A copy of the District Court's June 2, 2008 Order is included
in the Addendum at Tab 4)
III.

Disposition in the Trial Court
As admitted by the parties, the District Court concluded that it was factually

undisputed that disconnection of the Harvey Property from the City of Cedar Hills would
result in an island of unincorporated property, [R. at 1112.] Disconnection would leave
the Harvey Property as an island surrounded on all sides by either the City of Cedar Hills
or Pleasant Grove City. [Id.] Because the creation of an unincorporated island is
expressly prohibited by both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Utah disconnection
statute, the District Court summarily dismissed the Harveys' petition for disconnection
and granted summary judgment to Cedar Hills as to the disconnection issue. [R. at 1111.]
The District Court certified its decision on the disconnection issue as final and
appealable. [R. at 1110.]
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

In 1996, three brothers, David Harvey, J.H. Harvey and James Harvey,

4810-8446-643 5.CE003.002
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(collectively, the "Harvey Brothers") collectively petitioned to annex approximately 111
acres into the municipality of Cedar Hills, Utah County, Utah. [R. at 265, 273.] (A map
of the annexed property attached to the ordinance approving the annexation is included in
the Addendum at Tab 5)
2.

Prior to annexation, the property was open agricultural land and no

municipal services were directly available to any of the property to be annexed by the
Harvey Brothers. [R. at 272-73.]
3.

To provide municipal services, Cedar Hills was required to acquire water

rights, which it purchased from the three Harvey Brothers, and to install culinary water
lines. [Rat270, 1038.]
4.

Cedar Hills also installed sewer lines, pressurized irrigation lines and roads

to service the property annexed by the Harvey Brothers. [R. at 1038, 1045.] These
improvements included installing a road from the Cedar Hills city line through a portion
of Pleasant Grove City, which Cedar Hills donated or dedicated to Pleasant Grove at no
charge to provide appropriate traffic flow through Cedar Hills. [Id,]
5.

Because much of the Harvey Brothers property was relatively level, at least

compared to most of Cedar Hills, City leaders felt that a portion of the Harvey Brothers
property would be well suited for a city park to serve the residences to be built on Harvey
Brothers property and the surrounding community. [R. at 262, 268, 1046.] (A map of
the area within the annexation proposed for a park, which was attached to the annexation
ordinance, is also included in the Addendum at Tab 5.)

4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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6.

David and Dixie Harvey owned approximately 37.6 acres (the "Harvey

Property") of the property that was the subject of the petition to annex filed by the
Harvey Brothers. [R. at 288.]
7.

Approximately 1/3 or 14 acres of the Harvey Property was zoned high

density residential. [R. at 236.]
8.

The balance of the Harvey Property, approximately 23.9 acres, was zoned

public facility with the municipality intending to purchase all 23.9 acres from the
Harveys for a park and a cemetery. [R. at 287.]
9.

From 1997 until 2001 the municipality negotiated with the Harveys for the

purchase of the 23.9 acres for a park. [R. at 555.]
10.

The Harveys refused to sell the 23.9 acres for a park. [R. at 555.]

11.

On June 28 2001, the Harveys filed a request with Cedar Hills to rezone the

23.9 to a residential zone and alternatively, filed a request with Cedar Hills to disconnect
if the rezone was not granted. [R. at 4, 6.]
12.

The Harveys believed they would receive more money for the 23.9 acres if

rezoned or disconnected and sold for residences. [R. at 198.]
13.

On August 7 2001, the Harveys filed a petition to disconnect with the Utah

Fourth District Court. [R. at 1-7.]
14.

On September 5, 2001, the Harveys filed a lawsuit in the Utah Fourth

District Court sounding in inverse condemnation claiming damages, inter alia, because
Cedar Hills zoned the 23.9 acres public facilities and refused to rezone the property to a
residential designation. [R. at 196-99.]
4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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15.

On that same September 5, 2001, Cedar Hills filed a lawsuit against the

Harveys in eminent domain seeking to acquire the 23.9 acres for a park. [R 203-205.]
16.

In 2001 the Alpine School District filed a lawsuit in the Utah Fourth

District Court seeking to condemn approximately half of the remaining 23.9 acres of
Harvey Property for an elementary school and sought immediate occupancy. [R. at 209,
235.]
17.

The Alpine School was granted immediate occupancy, its condemnation

action has been resolved, and an elementary school, Deerfield Elementary is now on
approximately 12 of the 23.9 acres zoned public facilities. [R. at 209, 235.]
18.

This leaves approximately 12 acres that the Harveys still desire to

disconnect from Cedar Hills so that they can develop it into residences rather than have
the City acquire it for a park. [R. at 198.] (A map of the Harvey Property subject to the
disconnection petition is included in the Addendum at Tab 6.)
19.

In January of 2005, the Harveys agreed to proceed under the procedural

steps found in the 2003 version of the Utah disconnection statute (although the Harveys
originally filed their petition in 2001, the procedures for a petition for disconnection were
legislatively amended in 2003). {See page 2 of Harvey's [sic] Reply Memorandum in
Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Determine Appropriate
Statutory Standard, R. at 811).
20.

The Harveys admit that if the Harvey Property were disconnected from the

City of Cedar Hills, the Harvey Property would be an island of unincoiporated property
within Utah County. [R. at 1112, 1122 at 29:12-16; Brief of Appellant at 13.]
4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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21.

If disconnected the Harvey Property would be bounded entirely by Cedar

Hills or Pleasant Grove City. [R. at 1112.]
22.

In answer to various motions for summary judgment filed by both Cedar

Hills and the Harveys, Judge Taylor signed an Order on June 3, 2008, in which he
summarily dismissed the Harvey's petition for disconnection because it was undisputed
that disconnection would result in an island of unincorporated territory. [R. at 1111.]

4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Disconnection petitions that would result in unincorporated islands are now and
long have been prohibited by the Utah Disconnection Statute. It is undisputed that the
Harveys' petition to disconnect from Cedar Hills would result in an island of
unincorporated property completely surrounded by Cedar Hills and Pleasant Grove City.
The District Court correctly entered summary judgment denying the Harveys' petition for
disconnection because it was undisputed that it would result in an island of
unincorporated territory in Utah County. The District Court held that unincorporated
islands are prohibited under both the current version of the Disconnection Statute adopted
in 2003 and the prior version as it stood in 2001 when the Harveys filed their petition to
disconnect in court.
The parties do not question that the present version of the Disconnection Statute
prohibits islands. The Harveys, however, argue that the Disconnection Statute as it stood
in 2001 did not prohibit islands.
The 2001 version of the Disconnection Statute prohibited islands. The prohibition
in that version was expressed in several ways.

First, it evaluated islands and

unreasonably large peninsulas together. If a peninsula is unreasonable, it is prohibited.
Islands are treated the same as unreasonable peninsulas. Second, under the 2001 version
satisfaction of all the disconnection factors mandated disconnection, which indicates
failure to satisfy all factors, such as the impermissible creation of an island or
unreasonable peninsula, mandates that disconnection must be denied.

Third, the

evaluation of islands and unreasonable peninsulas must have meaning apart from the
4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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balance of the Disconnection Statute. The primary policy against islands is that they
inherently impair municipal services. Other factors evaluate the disconnection's impact
on all municipal services. Unless islands and unreasonable peninsulas are prohibited, this
factor is rendered superfluous and without meaning because it duplicates the other factors
under the Disconnection Statute.
Whether a disconnection petition created an unincorporated island has always
been closely considered by reviewing courts.

No Utah court has approved a

disconnection petition that created an island of unincorporated land. Because islands
disrupt the provision of public services by the responsible governmental entity, they are
disfavored. This public policy has always been manifest in the Disconnection Statute and
did not change when amendments were made to the law in 2003.
The express prohibition against all unincorporated islands in the current version of
the Disconnection Statute merely clarified ambiguous language in the 2001 version. The
legislative sponsors of the 2003 amendment to the Disconnection Statute stated that the
2003 amendment clarified awkward and ambiguous language. The prohibition in the
2003 amendment, as a clarifying statement, should be applied to prior legislative
expressions.
The policies against unincorporated islands are the same today as they long have
been. Islands are prohibited because they disrupt, inhibit or impair municipal services.
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, L.C v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, ^65, 167 P.3d 1016. The
Harveys5 petition to disconnect will impair municipal services and therefore was properly
dismissed.
4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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ARGUMENT
L

THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT DISCONNECTION WOULD
IMPERMISSIBLY
CREATE
AN
UNINCORPORATED
ISLAND
REQUIRED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE PETITION TO
DISCONNECT.
A. It Is Undisputed that Disconnection Would Create an Unincorporated
Island Requiring Summary Judgment.
The Harveys do not dispute that their petition to disconnect would create an island

of unincorporated property in Utah County completely surrounded by the cities of Cedar
Hills and Pleasant Grove. [R. at 1122: 19:11-14.] Based upon this undisputed fact, the
District Court entered summary judgment dismissing the Harvey's petition to disconnect
because it would result in an island of unincorporated property in Utah County. [R. at
1111.] Summary judgment should be affirmed when the record shows "that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56 (2008); Davis County Solid Waste Management
v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60, \% 52 P.3d 1174.
B. Unincorporated Islands Are Expressly Prohibited by the Current
Disconnection Statute.
The present Disconnection Statute expressly prohibits unincorporated islands
resulting from disconnection.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) (requiring

petitioners to show by a preponderance of evidence that a proposed disconnection would
not "leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory");
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, L.C v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, ^63, 167 P.3d 1016
("Clearly, if the disconnection creates an island of unincorporated territory, the

4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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disconnection is impermissible"). The Utah Supreme Court explained the policy behind
this prohibition stating, "islands disrupt, impair, or inhibit the provision of services and
therefore are prohibited." Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57 at ^[65.
C. Unincorporated Islands Were Prohibited by the Prior Act.
The 2001 Disconnection Statute prohibited islands well before the present version
was adopted in 2003. The text of the 2001 Disconnection Statute demonstrates the intent
to prohibit islands in two primary ways. First, the text of the 2001 Disconnection Statute,
like the current Disconnection Statute, draws a distinction between peninsulas that offend
the Disconnection Statute and those that do not. These offending peninsulas inherently
impair services like islands. Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57 at ^[67. If peninsulas were merely a
"consideration," as the Harveys argue, there would be no need to distinguish between
offending peninsulas that inherently impair services and those that do not. Second, if
islands and peninsulas were merely a factor among others to be "considered," as the
Harveys argue, then this factor becomes superfluous since it adds nothing to the
evaluation of a disconnection petition that isn't already evaluated by other factors in the
Disconnection Statute.
1. The 2001 Disconnection Statute Inherently Prohibited Islands,
Prior to 2003, the disconnection statute required courts to evaluate "whether or not
islands or unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or
project into the boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be
disconnected."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 10-2-503(2)(i) (2001).

The purpose of this

requirement is plain, both islands and "unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsular
4810-8446-6435.CEO03.002
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land masses" inherently impair services.
lihifiu'.l

Iliis inherent ir^v-ln

^>'.-<

.lie legislature had intended tins meter to simpi> be one

among others to be coiib -^v^

irvev^ digue, (here was no need to limit the

consideration to "unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsulai 1 iinl masses

A,N a

mere i onsideration, all peninsulas could be readily considered and the courts could easily
discount the minimal imparl of \iiiall peninsulas or protrusions into a iiiunicipality.
Instead, since 1972 the legislature has required courts tn rwilnafi* i*.lands and onl) some
offending peninsulas

- those which inherently impair services because they ai e

"unreasonably lame nv vuiinl-shaped peninsular land masses." UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2503(2)(i).

Although the pre-2003 lenslr

.

.;• - ; . . . . .

.

wen^ng

peninsula" was awkward and ambiguous, the intent seems plain. When : "^ - "i* •-

-o

large or irregularly shaped (hat it impairs services like an island, it is prohibited.
2. The Language of the 2001 Discunru-uiun jiaiuic Addressing Islands
Only Contains Meaning if Island < ••//••• Pmhih'f^d
The prohibition

nr~h-~t

Disconnectior

\^. - -

. ,:

•:Tending peninsulas m

me "*•*'

die standard requirement of sum.':.^ry

a.^e-

construction that each portion of a statute earry meaning and wiltii ^eearnie ijoiii me
balance **i me statute See Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of fiounfitid,
2002

*

*

Beverage Control, 2008 Ui M, r

e> .,..,., iJiu S^uiii, hie w Department of Alcoholic
* *"" ...-: •- e=,e .:• «, >uri . principles of

statuto.ry construction require it uto "assume that the legislature- used earh term m Hie
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statute advisedly5 and to 'interpret ] statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoid[ ]
rendering portions of the statute superfluous"' (further citation omitted)).
Islands must be prohibited under the 2001 version of the Disconnection Statute or
the statutory requirements relative to islands are rendered superfluous and without
meaning. The 2001 version required evaluation of the impact of a petition to disconnect
on four municipal services of water, sewer, law enforcement and zoning, plus a fifth
express factor of "other municipal services," which would necessarily include parks and
recreation and all other municipal services. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503(2) (2001). In
addition, the 2001 version required the evaluation of "whether or not islands and
unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or project into
the boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected." Id.
The shape of the island is insignificant. The reason for evaluating whether islands and
offending peninsulas result from the petition to disconnect is because they inherently
disrupt, impair or inhibit services. See Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57 at ^[65. Those would be the
same municipal services expressly listed as other factors under the Disconnection Statute.
As a practical and common-sense matter, an unincorporated island will always materially
increase the cost of providing municipal services. See id. at ffif 63-65 ("Clearly, if the
disconnection creates an island of unincorporated territory, the disconnection is
impermissible" because problems with unincorporated islands increase the city and
county's costs of providing municipal services). The requirement to evaluate islands and
offending peninsulas under the 2001 Disconnection Statute gains meaning only if that
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factor is somehow treated differently, iiiean- no -vily a islands ami offVndiiM', peninsulas
are prohibited.
_ s ^,^, 1'ti'jccti/ig

into LiiiL.\, .,./,i

....

/li/ziiv Property,

Were

Prohibited hv flu Prun-A,-*
This Court; should reject the Harveys' argument that prior to 2003, islands * --•
..«,:,: )l "

* i

. .mpc xSny were not prohibited but were merely a "consideration"
i

uinaci the Diseonno-. .

;

&6-~>''-

'- =

;

^-iore _003 J I B 98,

the bill amending the Disconnection Statute in 2003, clarified that nnmcorpoialed islands
are absolutely prohibited, prior versions of the disconnection act plainly prohibited
islands w 11 n 111 w 11 m i

linn i n i I l ' - ', jurisdiction to disconnect was

111; -11 i i h

dependent on some portion of the area seekini i- •* ••*

h

4ie

municipality. See In re West Jordan, In< . V>s> V 2d 2X6, i j Utah 2d 127 ^utah i.^o2j;
5v-'

•

*i

- »J *

• wiiiv.MV uig a disconnection petition filed by "a

majority of the real property owners in fenifory williin and I v mil tijHih (IK boi'ders ol any
incorporated city or town"), ( I he full ie\t of Section ii> 4-1 is included in the \ o o .. mcation ,-, _.-;/;- ; •:•• i& that unincorporated islands, like ihe Harvey

a *

Property, are complex'

-

-

•

•. • : • «^-

: always more than a mere

consideration and that the legislature always intended lo prohibit the same.
• ;•-•... .--• ci'.^ii . .
to \}r:ini a disi «-'.'.:

oi iiu; 200] Disconnection Statute permitted a trial court
-

•

*. -••..>.• .. • n. , ; j .lL

ntcJa in the

Disconnection Statute. Under the 2001 Disconnection StilluU ,i lnal oouM wa iijppo „(\1
lo appoint a commission made up of three disinterested people to apply the criteria in
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Section 10-2-503. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-502(2) (2001). These commissioners
evaluated the disconnection petition based upon the criteria in Section 10-2-503,
including the particular language at issue: "whether or not islands or unreasonably large
and varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries for
the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected." Id. at § 10-2-503(2)(i).
Based upon their investigation, the commissioners then made a report to the trial court.
See id. at § 10-2-505(1). After receiving the report, the trial court could hold a hearing.
See id.

The statute then stated that "[considering all of the evidence and the

commissioner's report, the court shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection
satisfies the criteria in Section 10-2-503." Id. at § 10-2-505(4).

If the proposed

disconnection did not satisfy the criteria in Section 10-2-503, including the creation of an
island or prohibited peninsula, then the trial court clearly could not order a disconnection.
The argument raised by the Harveys - that under the 2001 Disconnection Statute
the creation of unincorporated islands within a city was not a dispositive factor but
merely one consideration among many other factors - would actually permit the approval
of a disconnection petition even though an unincorporated island resulted, creating the
potential for unwieldy municipal boundaries contrary to the plain intention of the statute.
Such a suggestion goes contrary the public policy against the creation of unincorporated
islands and lends strength to the legislators' introductory statements discussed below that
2003 HB 98 was simply a clarifying amendment to the Disconnection Statute regarding
islands and peninsulas and not a substantive change. As a clarification of what an island
or offending peninsula is and a clarification that unincorporated islands and offending
4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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peninsulas are prohibited (if that alieaclv vv-'isn'i '•iiHlnenflv clear), I1"' chipiyifig
amendments in 2003 HB 98 appl)' to the Harveys' petition to disconnect and Judge
Tayloi 's order shoi lid be affirmed.
D. Unincorporated Islands Have Always Been Disfavored by the Law and
the Harvey Property Will Become an Unincorporated Island with NO
Immediate Prospect* Ml Annexing into a Municipality.
; n^ aa-, e;?>, i^ed ii^n inert' petition should not be prohibited because the isbrd to
be crer*4 ^

*'- *'

Appellant v

;

-'pornled I Jtali i 'ouiily temporarily. \bw unej 01

flm lnui i< speculative at best

Pleasant Grove < i •

-"••

:>!y

municipality that could possibly annex the Harvey Property. However, at the time the
District Coin t signed his 01 der Pleasant Gi ove City was pre^,^k;w -. . sa^ IK>?^ annexing
- : ^- - ..

the Harvey Property since the annexation poliev -:l^c\r:^<not encompass the Harvey Property. PR. at i06]. 107'*

J

1

-der Utah's Annexation Act,

a i ilv raiinol allompl to annex a parcel unless it has previously adopted an annexation
policy declaration encompassing ^u ;•-- - -:

• '-.

.

(2008). The Pleasant Grove annexation policy declaration has not boon modified since
2002 and does not include the Harveys' Property.
1, Utah Courts I lav Always Prohibited tin* Creation of I hiimorporated
Islands.
Once disconnected, without dispute the Harvey Property would become part of
unincorporated I '(ah County
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disconnection that would create an unincorporated island.2 See generally Continental
Bank & Trust Co v. Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242, 1247 (Utah 1979); Application of
Peterson, 66 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Utah 1932) (affirming disconnection of property lying
between Town of Moab and Grand County after noting "[i]t is not as if the segregated
lands would leave a hiatus between one part of the town and another").
Utah appellate courts have always recognized statutory prohibitions against
unincorporated islands. See Farmington City, 599 P.2d at 1247. Utah's laws governing
annexations and disconnections both proscribe actions that would create unincorporated
islands. According to Utah law governing statutory construction, statutory provisions
should be interpreted "in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related
Counsel for the Cedar Hills does not make this assertion lightly. Counsel conducted
extensive research into all Utah cases it could find applying the Utah Disconnection
Statute. See Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57; South Jordan City v. Sandy City, 870 P.2d 273 (Utah
1994); In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland City, 668 P.2d 544 (Utah
1983); In re Disconnection of Territory and Restriction of the Corporate Limits of the
City of Draper, 646 P.2d 699 (Utah 1982); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmington
City, 599 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1979); In re Disconnection of Territory from Layton City, 494
P.2d 948 (Utah 1972); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City of Bingham Canyon, 415 P.2d 209
(Utah 1966); In re Disconnection of Part of the Territory of West Jordan, Inc., 369 P.2d
286 (Utah 1962); In re Disconnection of Part of the Territory of West Jordan, Inc., 355
P.2d 713 (Utah 1960); Howard v. Town of North Salt Lake, 323 P.2d 261 (Utah 1958);
Howard v. Town of North Salt Lake, 281 P.2d 216 (Utah 1955); Application of Peterson,
66 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1937); In re Peterson, 48 P.2d 468 (Utah 1935); Plutus Mining Co. v.
Orme, 289 P. 132 (Utah 1930); In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., 266 P. 1044 (Utah
1928); In re Smithfield City, 262 P. 105 (Utah 1927); Christensen v. Town of Clearfield,
243 P. 376 (Utah 1926); In re Barton, 92 P. 770 (Utah 1907); In re Fullmer, 92 P. 768
(Utah 1907). In some cases, Counsel was required to conduct factual research beyond
merely reading the opinions. For example, the opinion Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City of
Bingham Canyon, 415 P.2d 209 (Utah 1966) does not provide sufficient factual
information to determine whether an unincorporated island was created by the
disconnections affirmed in those cases. Counsel was required to research the
disconnection records recorded in the Utah State Archives to find maps showing that the
disconnections did not in fact result in the creation of an unincorporated island.
4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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chapters." Miller \ Wcava\ 2003 Lag*>nn Amusemen;

\2, *,;,, 66 l'.3d 592. In Farnw -<->r •

• appealer '•.* dismissal of its petition I disconnect from

Farmington ( '"

i

- *

•'"-"'

:-.nnssyi • >i --e xiisconnection

petition after reasoning, among other things, that if the disconnection were appi o\ ed,
luiurc cxpansiu: •- « amuiigton would require "a corridor ,. . . be left open, extending
westward

;

**

.-.-rn most boundary, to avoid the creation of

an unincorporated island in the midst of the cit\

• .: e

•« •

^

Court in Farmington in 1°°^ the potential creation or an unincorporated island was not a
more f'»r|nr (oi consideration

K waN a dispositive factor "mandating]" denial under

Utah law. See id.
Before 2003, Utah appellate courts that affirmed discomiections consisted

^r;:*

ibiiiui I hat Hie disconnection would not create an, unincorporated island, For example, in
1983, the Utah Supreme C-- *~ <^-

- -•; .

. \ propenv in,:-, Highland

Ciix' only after first concluding that "the district court found. ih:e ,KO'SUK'
CJOI

• * ' ;; .unds or peninsiH.»- witliin. the City's boundaries

>>•

/.J

" Highland City, 668

P.2d at 546. Siiiiilaih , (lie \ Mali Siipieiii*' Cowl ;i limned the disconnection of property
from the City of Draper only after first finding that "' , '»br - ;-i :M-. ••,.

- *.,:

islands or peninsulas which would, leave the municipality with a residual area that would
have the eff'---

-v; , .:•;.,_

providing municipal

sendees to

The statute that the Court rened up».»u concerned me prohibition against the creatior of
islands by approving annexation petitions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-402 (19'"?).
Interpreting the Disconnection Statute in harmony with the related law governing
annexations, which prohibited the creation of unincorporated islands, it is clear that *-ie
creation of an, island should be considered dispositive. See Miller, 2003 UT 12 at % 17
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disproportionately high or unreasonable levels. In re Disconnection of Territory and
Restriction of the Corporate Limits of the City of Draper, 646 P.2d 699, 702-703 (Utah
1982). Without expressly saying so, the Draper and Highland City cases strongly imply
that if the respective disconnections would have created an unincorporated island, the
petitions for disconnection would have been denied.
Recent dicta from the Utah Supreme Court in the Bluffdale case also illustrates
that Utah disconnection law has long prohibited unincorporated islands. See Bluffdale,
2007 UT 57 atfflf63-65. In Bluffdale, the Supreme Court applied the 2003 version of the
Disconnection Statute, but the instruction is relevant to the history of Utah disconnection
law. See id. Even though the facts did not invite discussion of the prohibition against
unincorporated islands (because it was factually undisputed that disconnection would not
create an island), the Court still took the opportunity to provide instruction regarding the
prohibition against unincorporated islands. Id. The Court noted the policy considerations
for prohibiting islands - that "islands disrupt, impair, or inhibit the provision of services,"
and noted that islands are unquestionably impermissible because of those policies. Id. at
f65. The Court made those observations without citing to the 2003 version of the statute,
and without mentioning the 2003 amendment. See id. That the Court took the time to
discuss unincorporated islands when the facts did not require such a discussion, and the
fact that the Court discussed the prohibition as a policy matter without relying on the
2003 statutory language, persuasively suggests that the Court wanted to make it clear that
Utah disconnection law has always prohibited unincorporated islands. See id.
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2. Public Policy Prohibiting Ihiifworfumtted

Islands //</v Not (luaiy}i\L

The TTvh Legislature wi\< n n acting on any new policy considerations when it
at- .>!<.•: -

mguage m ,\u .-.seunneuion Statute in 2003 KB 98; the policy
« -: h *

reasons for prohibiting un,r

.v.* : >^;ie. :ee generally

House and Senate Floor .Debates regarding 2003 HB 98 referenced //:*•.•-• '•'••- .'f.
Unincorporated islands have always been impermissible localise ''U oi* concern for
symme1ric;il municipal boundaries, (,.'"') island-

; >*h

• > /.};». , i.w. <.;..[.:> o-* the

responsible county to provide services; access to the *:?• •*--\^ * •- * \

• -•

be

difficult'', and (3) islands "may impair or inhibit a city iTom providing services from one
]•

*

:<-.'"

*

•.:i'/;.."::/:. - :

cross over incorporated land, vviiii icapcu u>

%:

a. *. w3.
?••

u

Tf the county has to

* * ' " . . w. y services, the

county would be required to obtain easements or assume potentially difficult negotiations
v "•

- ^

\\ii\,u\s, a Lily may have to obtain easements over the

island in order for the cilv to provide municipal services lo propertv lutaied an all sides
of the island. See id. "Such problems increase the county's [and city's] cost o! pro\ nhng
iiecessai)

ser vices and may ultimately render the provisions of such services

impractical." Id,
For the reasons described in the preceding paragraph, the Utah legislate
lHall Supreme , u ^
unincorporated

:i,<\.

long recognized a piamc noiicv siricliy prohibiting

•••• ..:•

r

• • ->. current!, i.-i.uu , I nie 1*\ Chapter

2, Part 4 of the Utah Code, expressly and imamhir.:

:i • • .

•

.mum-e

found in the disconnection statute reads almost identical to the language found in die
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annexation statute. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-502.7 (2008) ("[T]he proposed
disconnection will not . . . leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of
unincorporated territory.") with UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-402(l)(b) (2008) ("An
unincorporated area may not be annexed to a municipality unless . . . annexation will not
leave or create an unincorporated island or peninsula . . . ."). Thus, whether under the
2001 or 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute, it is clear from the statutory language
that a disconnection petition creating an island of unincorporated land cannot be
approved.
The policy reasons for prohibiting unincorporated islands are the same now as
they have been since well before the 2003 amendments. As the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Bluffdale suggests, and as the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held over
the years, unincorporated islands have always been prohibited because those islands
impair counties and cities from efficiently providing municipal services. See Bluffdale,
2007 UT 57 atffif63-65. Therefore, the District Court was correct in concluding that it is
immaterial which version of the statute applies because the Harveys' petition for
disconnection must fail under both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Disconnection
Statute.
II.

THE PROHIBITION AGAINST UNINCORPORATED ISLANDS IN THE
CURRENT ACT CLARIFIED WHAT WAS PROHIBITED UNDER THE
PRIOR ACT.
The Harveys suggest that the District Court should have determined whether the

2003 version of the Disconnection Statute should apply retroactively.
Appellant at 16.]
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Cedar Hills does not dispute the general rule that "statutes not
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expressly retroactive should only be applied prospectively"

/" 'v Pis< oimrrfi n /

Certain Territory fi-om Highland City, 668 P.2d 544, 549 (Utah 1983). However, ruling
on i eti oactivil^ < * a: : not i equired because the District Coin I: plainly ruled that both the
2001 and the 2003 versions of the Disconnexion Ntaluir prohibit .ill iiniiieoipuMted
islands. fR. .-.: " '* *

The District Court correctly judged that the express prohibition

againsl •• • .:-: jorporaica ^^.uus in inc present Disconnection Statute was not materially
different from the prohi:

>

-, -y

•-

•;•.«;.•..

. u

-

.,

• 1

version. [Id.] Indeed, the Distnci Loiui iieid :iuu "there is no material difference on the
dispositive pom: v;i la., between the two versions of rthc Disconnection statute]." [hi]
fnic

*:- '"'•••:

disconnection

Statute, "if a disconnection \\ouId reov**i m a^ unineoiporaied island '*

-•

-

.-n

should be disallowed," [Id,] Under both versions, the Harveys5 petition would fail, but
even if only liie .!0ul \CIMOIIJ of (lit: Disconnection .Statute applied, ttie District Court
appropriately denied the Harveys' petition and granted si iiii mary ji ldgment to Cedai - ;s.
A. The 2003 Amendment to the Disconnection Statute Clarified that
Islands Are Prohibited.
While it "-lioulil W iibnndantly vM\\\ lli.il the 'IK*1 Disconnection Statute piohibitcd
all unincorporated islands, die 2003 amendments to the Disconnection Si-;*'.

^

clarification to the extent there was any ambiguity. Utah courts have long heiu ihal wucn
•"•••'^ :,»*" *-*u ^

"•

!••-.•.

. v.* : ua^L — -* ^-iiinricaiivins are to be applied to

prior less clear statutory expressions because the clarifications did n I subManth rly
change the law. See Okland Const Co, v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d 208, 210- 11
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(Utah 1974); State in Interest of D.B., 925 P.2d 178, 182 n. 5 (Utah Ct App. 1982)
(quoting 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.01 (5th ed. 1993))
(concluding, based on a legislator's introductory statement that amendment was an
attempt to clarify the statute, that amendment clarified existing statute—it did not
substantively change the law). Specifically, Utah courts will not apply the "judicial
policy against retroactive laws . . . 'where the later statute or amendment deals only with
clarification or amplification as to how the law should have been understood prior to its
enactment.5" In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland City, 668 P.2d 544,
548 (Utah 1983) (quoting Okland Construction Co., 520 P.2d at 210-11).
When the Disconnection Statute was last amended in 2003, the legislators'
introductory statements declared that the reworded portions were simply clarifications of
what the law already was. Senator Bell, the Senate sponsor of 2003 HB 98, explained
that it was "an extremely boring bill" that merely clarified the "ambiguous" and
"awkward" language found in the disconnection statute. Senate Floor Debate Recording
at

http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?Houser:::S

(choose

"2003

General

Legislative Session", "Day 31 (2/19/2003)", "HB 0098"). (An electronic file of this
recording are included with the electronic copy of this Brief. See Addendum at Tab 8.)
Similarly, Representative Hardy, the House sponsor of 2003 HB 98, explained that 2003
HB 98 "clarifies the criteria the courts should apply in determining the merits on a
disconnection."

House

Floor

Debate

http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?House:::::H

(choose

Legislative Session", "Day 18 (2/6/2003)", "HB 0098").
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Recording
"2003

at
General

(An electronic file of this

recording are included with the electi 01:11c copy of this Bi ief See Addendum at I ab 8 )
As :i clarification, the express prohibition against islands in 2003 HB 98 should be
apphe, .. -:;c pre-2003 expressions against islands. The Di.stri.ct Court, correctly entered
summary judgment denying (IK* II.MW \ / disconiu'otinn pHi(iot) beuuise Ihi: Harveys did
iio( dispute their petition would result in an island and, as 2003 HB 9b dkr 'Vd,
disconnect,on ^ :caviug unincorporated islands are now and long have been prohibited.
•

5

•

-:o!]fiecliuii StiiUilc Ihal were merely '"clariii^d"J by 2003

HB 98 necessarily were factors that were already in the statute but v / • / --v-

• -J

vd

awkwardly or ambiguously, as Senator Bell mentioned. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. §§
> -

<

-

.....', o

requirement addressing islands ana oiicndin^ n< 1 • ;•,

\
.

'

i2003)
«

* >.

The
and

ambiguous. That requirement was expressed as "whether or not islands or unreasonably
large 01 varied-shapes peninsular land masses result within, or project into the boundaries
of the municipality from which (fir innlni v v< to ho disconnected." 111 AH O »OB ANN. §
10-2-503(2)(i) (2001).4 With the clarification in the 2003 amendments, the legislature
further confirmed that the creation i-i .u\ inland or offending peninsula required the den ial
of a disconnection petition

V, <, Mi \ m ODI^ANN ; Id .' > < K ? / u>00<).

4

What amounted to an unreasonably large or -varied-shaped peninsular land mass was so
awkward and ambiguous that 2003 HH (>8 actually tried to define what an offending
peninsula is and even then the Utah Supreme (\>un declared that the clarified defmn. >n
{
was ambiguous. Bluffdale Moulin fln,^
: .- RfufWalr 07r ?f)(H \ II ' 5n • ^
167P.3d 1016.
4Kil). t S44f>^4r» ( 'hOOi 0 0 J
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B. The 2001 Disconnection Statute Was Not Limited to Unincorporated
Islands Wholly Within Municipalities.
The Harveys, nevertheless, argue that what constituted an island was ambiguous
because the language of the Disconnection Statute prior to 2003 could be misread to
mean only islands completely within and surrounded by a single city were prohibited.
That contortion ignores the more natural reading that the terms "result within" and
"project into" both apply to islands as expressed in the disconnection act prior to 2003.
Whether islands are within the borders of a municipality or between the borders of two or
more municipalities, they "impair or inhibit the ability of the responsible county to
provide services." Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57 at <[[64; see also e.g. Continental Bank & Trust
Co. v. Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242, 1247 (Utah 1979) (affirming the denial of a
disconnection petition because it would create an unincorporated island). The county's
difficulty of providing services to these different types of unincorporated islands is no
different.
The Harveys argue that the 2001 version of the Disconnection Statute only affects
islands created completely "within" a single municipality. See Brief of Appellant at 13.
The policies behind the Disconnection Statute counsel against such a narrow reading.
Islands and peninsulas that would impair or inhibit the provision of municipal services
offend the disconnection act in both its present and prior forms. See Bluffdale, 2007 UT
57 at ^[64-67. Providing services to a large or varied-shaped peninsula that is "within" a
city but would be left to protrude out of that city by a disconnection may be equally
difficult as providing services around a similar peninsula projecting into a city's borders.
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Thus, both the terms "within' alio l^
terms "within" and "prqKo l:i\o

<

•

•' M

i;v-<\ u> islands smuer die pre-2003 Disconnection

hnvidmg services to islands either 'within" a city or islands completely
surrounded by more than "m morpo'Mied n(\ ">»' l |»iu|ccl " ^

i « \\\ pt«.vents equal

challenges.
\ :u ^uuhiaUkjL^ ii.
statute

*

:

• •• "

»H> -8 should be applied to the pre-2003 disconnection
T

-

:i:

*:-^*.-'. ,..

and made some substantive changes.

.,.'.:•.*»•. .useonnection procedures

The substantive elianj^N ran hr if 'dily

distinguished from the clarifying language refeixed to by Senator Bell and Representative
Hardy btvause Hi" substantia1 i liaiigc. add new requirements, such as factors that were
not previously listed in the disconnection statute

Sn In u Disi-onnn tion <*f (\-Ktiin

Territory from Highland City, 668 P.2d at 549. For example, since 2003 district courts
are required In onsulci wlielher a proposed disconnection would leave an area in the
county where it would be di; ::

wi

: ~- *

s

- '^ *r •<. •-

- ,>s. r, --. . *MC-

from the municipality. See UTAH CODi: ANN. § 10-2-502.7(3)kh (J-'^-.S;. i'liui iv ^uui
llie disLunnection ,^.s .... :^f recmlre courts to directly consider the county's ability to
provide services to dise-oimmui jnras, although interests of justice and equity may have
drawn a court's attention to the county's abilities. Because islands were addressed h\ *••r-.-juKiiCwikiii "MMIUU I»_-JOIV. ihe 2003 amendments, tin: 2003 amendment? related to
iv!an

-'-> •

i

- "-

-•

r'

.-,,

Accordingly, the District (Jour1 p^perh roncludeu w.
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1tL

.,ui fiance oi the law.
* .

•= . v«

versions

of the Disconnection Statute prohibit islands and that the court must deny the Harvey's
disconnection petition and grant Cedar Hills summary judgment under either version.
III.

The Harveys5 Petition to Disconnect Would Impermissibly Impair Services.
The Harveys' petition to disconnect raises the very concerns that the legislature

sought to address in the Disconnection Statute and that the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Bluffdale identified—that an island would impair or inhibit the provision of
services. To provide drinking water to the property owned by the Harveys and the
properties owned by David Harvey's two brothers, which were annexed into Cedar Hills
at the same time, Cedar Hills purchased water rights and a well, ironically, from the
Harvey brothers.5 [R. at 270, 1038.] Cedar Hills also installed a pressurized secondary
irrigation water system in the road in front of the Harvey Property. [R. at 1038.] Cedar
Hills installed sewer lines with an easement for a main collector line at the bottom or
south side of the Harvey Property. [Id.] To better accommodate the dramatic increase in
traffic from the many new residences on property annexed into Cedar Hills by the
Harveys and David Harveys' brothers, and the elementary school next to the Harvey
Property proposed for disconnection, Cedar Hills constructed, not only roads within the
annexed area, but even constructed a connector road outside the Cedar Hills city
boundaries and dedicated or granted that road to Pleasant Grove. [Id.]
The impairment of parks and recreation within Cedar Hills is the primary impact
the Harveys' petition would have on municipal services. Cedar Hills, as part of the
5

Cedar Hills had to submit a change of use application, converted those water rights from
agricultural to municipal use and did all else required to provide culinary drinking water
to the Harvey Property.
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negotiations to annex all of the property from the three Harvey Brothers, identified the
need for a city park. [R. at 554-58.] Absent a city park on the Harvey Property, Cedar
Hills will not have even the standard amount of park space that it typically requires to be
dedicated as part of its development process. Because Cedar Hills hugs the mountain
side at the mouth of American Fork Canyon, there is very little level space for a park in
the City. [See id.] If Cedar Hills fails to obtain the Harvey Property for a park, it is
doubtful that any park with the features envisioned for the Harvey Property will ever be
developed.
Because the property is surrounded by incorporated land, there is no convenient or
inexpensive way for Utah County to provide services to the Harvey. The Harveys5
disconnection petition is nothing more than an attempt to avoid selling the land to Cedar
Hills as a park so that the Harveys can instead develop the land into residences in another
jurisdiction, presumably, but as yet unestablished, at a premium sales price.

This

disconnection is sought after David Harvey and his brothers induced Cedar Hills into
installing all standard municipal services. The prohibition against islands was certainly
intended to prevent such manipulations, no matter which legislative expression of the
Disconnection Statute is applied.
CONCLUSION
Because both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Disconnection Statute prohibit the
creation of unincorporated islands, the District Court correctly dismissed the Harveys'
petition for disconnection and granted summary judgment to Cedar Hills. Therefore,
Cedar Hills respectfully requests that the ruling of the District Court be AFFIRMED.
4810-8446-6435.CE003.002
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DATED: February / \ 2009,

SMITH HARTVIGSEN,

PLLC

Eric Todd Johnson
R. Christopher Preston
Kyle Fielding
Attorneys for the City of Cedar Hills
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following:

Gordon Duval
Duval Haws and Moody, P.C.
947 South 500 East, Suite 200
American Fork, Utah 84003
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10-2-503

UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE

The issue of '"justice and equity" is largelyY
based on fact as found by trial court whose2
rulings should not be disturbed unless it is3
made to appeal clearly erroneous In re Laytuni
City, 27 Utah 2d 241, 494 P2d 948 (1972)
Decree disconnecting an 80-acre tract from
cnVy was consistent with "justice and equity"
,
where (1) the 80-acre tract was half of parcel
and othei half was outside city boundary, (2)
the topography of the parcel made it desirable
to develop the entire 160 acres as one tract, (3)j
the tract within the city was without streets,
improvements, or buildings, (4) the city was5
providing the tract with no municipal services,
and (5) disconnection of the tract would causei
neither an impairment of municipal functions;
nor a substantial loss of tax revenue to the city
In re Layton Citj, 27 Utah 2d 241 494 P.2d 948>
(1972)
The determination of what constitutes "justice and equity" turns on the facts of eachi

individual case, and district court's findings
will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly
erroneous In le Disconnection of Certain Territorv, 668 P.2d 544 (Utah 1983)
Terms of s e v e r a n c e .
The matter of the adjustment of the terms
upon which the territory shall be severed from
the town or city is a matter that must be
brought to the attention of the commissioners,
and not to the court before their appointment
In re Fullmer, 33 Utah 43, 92 P. 768 (1908)
(decided under former section, authorizing
commibSioners to adjust terms)
Validity of p e t i t i o n .
Petition to disconnect, defective because it
was not signed by a majority of registered
voters (before 1993 amendment of this section
substituting property owners foi voters), was
properly dismissed South Jordan City v Sandy
City, 870 P.2d 273 (Utah 1994)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 62 C J.S Municipal Corporations
§§ 59 to 61

10-2-503. Criteria for disconnection.
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will
leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which the
cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would materially
increase over previous years or for which it would become economically or
practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality.
(2) In making that determination, the commissioners shall consider all
relevant factors including the effect of the disconnection on:
(a) the city or community as a whole;
(b) adjoining property owners;
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways;
(d) water mains and water services;
(e) sewer mains and sewer services;
(f) law enforcement;
(g) zoning,
(h) other municipal services; and
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large or varied-shaped
peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries of the
municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected.
History: C. 1953, 10-2-503, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, <> 2; 1983, ch. 28, * 2; 1996, ch.
132, § 3.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, added the subsection designations in Subsection (1) substituted "The commissioners shall determine" for

"The court for the purposes of determining
whether or not terntor}' should be disconnected
shall consider", in Subsection (2) substituted
"In making that determination, the commission" for "The court" in the introductor} language and made stylistic and related changes
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10-2-505

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Disconnection warranted.
„
. .
r„ rtr ,r,
i
Retroactivity of 1983 amendment.
fche
Disconnection warranted.
Disconnection of an area from the city was
warranted where the area was wholly agricultural in nature; the city did not have a municipal sewer system and it was not likely that it
would acquire one; there was no municipal
water system within the city and no negotiations for the purchase of a water system had
occurred; there had been no municipal improvements within the area; the city had provided
minimal police and fire protection; there was an
absence of common social, economic, and geographic interests between the area and the city;
there was no evidence that the city would be

prejudiced by disconnection other than by the
loss of property taxes; disconnection would not
create islands or peninsulas which would leave
d t y wifch a r e g i d u a l a r e a thafc w o u W

have

tne

effect of increasing the cost of providing
services to disproportionately high or unreasonable levels; and there was ample room for
growth and development of the city without the
area. In re Disconnection of Certain Territory,
646 P.2d 699 (Utah 1982).

Retroactivity of 1983 a m e n d m e n t .
The 1983 amendment to this section, adding
the requirement of consideration of the community as a whole and adjoining owners, alters the
substantive law and does not have retroactive
application. In re Disconnection of Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544 (Utah 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§§ 59 to 61.

10-2-504. Commissioners' h e a r i n g and report.
(1) Within 30 calendar days of their appointment, the commissioners shall
hold a public hearing.
(2) At least seven calendar days before the hearing date, the commissioners
shall notify the parties and the public of the public hearing by publishing a
notice in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality or if there
is none, then by posting notice of the hearing in at least three public places
within the municipality.
(3) In the public hearing, any person may speak and submit documents
regarding the disconnection proposal.
(4) Within 45 calendar days of the hearing, the commissioners shall report
to the court their findings and reasons regarding:
(a) the criteria and factors provided in Section 10-2-503;
(b) the liabilities of the municipality and territory to be disconnected
that have accrued during the time in which the territory was part of the
municipality; and
(c) the mutual property rights of the municipality and the territory to
be disconnected.
l9

History: C. L953, 10-2-504, e n a c t e d by SL
77, ch. 48, § 2; 1996, ch. 132, § 4.
"
Amendment N o t e s . — The 1996 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1996, rewrote the
section.

10-2-505. Court action*
a

(1) Upon receiving the commissioners' report, the court may, upon request of
Party or upon its own motion, conduct a court hearing.

343

10-2-506

UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE

(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence presented by petitioners
and the municipality regarding the viability of the disconnection proposal
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove the viability of the
disconnection and t h a t justice and equity require that the territory be
disconnected from the municipality by a preponderance of the evidence
(4) Considering all the evidence and the commissioners' report, the court
shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria m
Section 10-2-503
(5) The court's ordei either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be m
writing with findings and reasons
History. C. 1953, 10-2-505, e n a c t e d by L.
1977, ch*48, * 2; 1996, ch. 132, § 5.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1996 amend

merit effective April 29, 1996, r e m o t e the
section

10-2-506. Taxes to meet municipal obligations.
(1) If the court orders a disconnection of territory from a m u n i c i p a l ^ , the
court shall also order the county legislative body to levy taxes on the property
within the disconnected territory that may be required to pay the territory's
proportionate share of the municipal obligations accrued while the territory
was part of the municipality
(2) An} tax levy ordered b} the court under Subsection (1) shall be collected
bj the count}7 treasurer in the same manner as though the disconnected
t e m t o r \ were a municipality
(3) The county treasurei shall pay to those entities named by the court the
revenue received from that tax lev}
History: C. 1953, 10-2-506, e n a c t e d b\ L
1977, ch. 48, * 2; 1993, ch. 227, * 30; 1996,
ch. 132, ^ 6.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1996 amend
ment effective April 29 1996, added the sub
section designations in Subsection (11 added ' If

the court ordeis a disconnection of territory
from a municipality and accrued while the
t e r n t o n was part of the municipality," in Subsection (2) inserted "undei Subsection (1)' and
made s t \ h s t i c and related changes

NOTES TO DECISIONS
P a y m e n t of bonded i n d e b t e d n e s s
Foimer section vested in the couit the powei
to impose taxes to be levied on the detached
terntorv in pioper cases but it did not impose
an obligation to pa) an\ portion of towns
bonded indebtedness as a condition to v\ ith
diavval at least wheic the commission decided

in favor of severance without imposition of
terms and where the indebtedness for the
u ater and sewei svstem was incurred after
filing of petition for withdiawal and the sewer
s\stem was not available to petitionei and the
vvatei svstem did not benefit the petitioner In
re Peterson 92 Utah 212 66 P2d 1195 (1937)

10-2-507. Decree — Filing of d o c u m e n t s — Notice requirements.
(1) Upon entering a disconnection order, the court shall file a certified copy
of the ordei and a transparent lepioducible copy of the map or plat in the
countv recoidei -» office
(2) Within 30 calendar days of the court's disconnection ordei the municip a l ^ shall file amended articles of incorporation in the lieutenant governor's
and county recoiders office^
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10-2-502.7

10-2-502.5. Hearing on request for disconnection — Determination by municipal legislative body — Petition in district court.
(1) Within 30 calendar days after the last publication of notice required
under Subsection 10-2-501(3)(a), the legislative body of the municipality in
which the area proposed for disconnection is located shall hold a public
hearing.
(2) At least seven calendar days before the hearing date, the municipal
legislative body shall provide notice of the public hearing:
(a) in writing to the petitioners and to the legislative body of the county
in which the area proposed for disconnection is located; and
(b) by publishing a notice in a newspaper of general circulation within
the municipality or, if there is none, then by posting notice of the hearing
in at least three public places within the municipality.
(3) In the public hearing, any person may speak and submit documents
regarding the disconnection proposal.
(4) Within 45 calendar days of the hearing, the municipal legislative body
shall:
(a) determine whether to grant the request for disconnection; and
(b) if the municipality determines to grant the request, adopt an
ordinance approving disconnection of the area from the municipality.
(5) (a) A petition against the municipality challenging the municipal legislative body's determination under Subsection (4) may be filed in district
court by:
(i) petitioners; or
(ii) the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is
located.
(b) Each petition under Subsection (5)(a) shall include a copy of the
request for disconnection.
History: C. 1953, 10-2-504, e n a c t e d by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 2; 1996, ch. 132, § 4; renumbered by L. 2003, ch. 279, § 2.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 2003 amend-

merit effective May 5, 2003, rewrote and renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 10-2-504.

10-2-502.7- Court action.
(1) After the filing of a petition under Section 10-2-502.5 and a response to
the petition, the court shall, upon request of a party or upon its own motion,
conduct a court hearing.
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence regarding the viability of
the disconnection proposal.
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence:
(a) the viability of the disconnection;
(b) that justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected
from the municipality;
(c) that the proposed disconnection will not:
(i) leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for
which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal
services would materially increase over previous years;
385
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(u) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function as a municipality, or
(m) leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory, and
(d) that the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is
located is capable, in a cost-effective manner and without materially
increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of providing
to the area the services that the municipality will no longer provide to the
area due to the disconnection
(4) In determining whether petitioners have met their burden of proof with
respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (n), the court shall consider all relevant
factors, including the effect of the proposed disconnection on
(a) the municipality or community as a whole,
(b) adjoining property owners,
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways,
(d) water mams and water services,
(e) sewer mams and sewer services,
(f) law enforcement,
(g) zoning, and
(h) other municipal services
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be in
writing with findings and reasons
History. C 1953, 10-2-505, e n a c t e d by L
1977, c h . 48, § 2, 1996, c h 132, § 5, renumbered by L 2003, c h 279, § 3
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s — The 2003 amend

ment effective Ma) 5 2003 rewrote and re
numbeied this section which formerly ap
peared as § 10 2 505

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Conditions precedent
Disconnection warranted
Justice and equit)
Conditions p r e c e d e n t
Payment of some portion of bonded indebted
ness of town was not condition precedent to
withdrawal where for example indebtedness
for water and sewer system was incurred after
filing of petition foi withdraw al sewer system
was not available to petitioner and water s\s
tern was less available than privately owned
system which ran thiough the land and in
which petitioner was large ownei In re Peter
son 92 Utah 212 66 P2d 1195 (1937)
Before the couit can pass upon the justice
and equity of the matter it mubt Mist determine
judiciall} the existence of the lequisites fixed
by the legislature Thus it must first determine
that the required number of property owners
were petitioners and it cannot count persons
who intervene a^ petitioners Howard \ Town
of N Salt Lake 3 Utah 2d 189 281 P 2d 216
(1955)
D i s c o n n e c t i o n warranted
Disconnection of an area from the cit\ w as

warranted where the area was wholly agncul
tural in nature the cit\ did not have a mumc
lpal sewei system and it was not likely that it
would acquire one theie was no municipal
water system within the city and no negotia
tions foi the purchase of a water system had
occurred there had been no municipal improve
mentb within the aiea the city had provided
minimal police and fire protection there was an
absence of common social economic and geo
graphic interests between the area and the city,
there was no e\idence that the city would be
prejudiced b^ disconnection other than by the
loss of propert} taxes disconnection would not
create islands or peninsulas which would leave
the citv with a residual area that would have
the effect of increasing the cost of providing
bcr\iceb to disproportionately high or unrea
bonable le\els and there was ample room for
growth and development of the cit> without the
area In ie Disconnection of Certain Territory
646 P2d 699 (Utah 1982)
J u s t i c e and equity
In the determination of what constitutes jus
tice and equity warranting a severance the
facts in each case under well recognized p n n
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
City of Cedar Hills,
Plaintiff

ORDER
Date: June 2, 2008

vs.
Case Number: 010403694
David C. Harvey, et. al.,
Defendants

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

This matter came before the Court for oral argument on April 4, 2008. The Plaintiff was
present represented by Eric Todd Johnson, and the Defendants, David and Dixie Harvey, were
ilso present and represented by counsel, Gordon Duval. Also present was David Church,
representing Cedar Hills in the constitutional rights companion case. The Court ruled from the
bench for summary judgment in favor of Cedar Hills on the issue of disconnection, and counsel
for Cedar Hills prepared an order. The Harveys filed an objection to the order, which was, in
substance, a motion to reconsider. After reviewing the proposed order and the objection, the
Court finds and orders:
The operative facts are undisputed. The real property that is the subject of this
dispute is entirely surrounded by incorporated territory, either in Cedar Hills or in
Pleasant Grove. If the Court were to grant the motion for disconnection, the order
would effectively create an island of unincorporated land.
The parties argued over whether the Court should proceed under the 2001 or 2003

Page 1 of 4

version of the Disconnection statute.
3.

After carefully comparing both versions of the Disconnection statute, the Court
finds that there is no material difference on the dispositive point of law between
the two versions of the statute at issue. Under either the 2001 or 2003 versions of
the Disconnection statute, if a disconnection would result in an unincorporated
island, the disconnection should be disallowed.

4.

Because the disconnection sought by the Harveys in this matter would create an
island of unincorporated territory as prohibited by both the 2001 and 2003
versions of the Disconnection statute, such disconnection is DENIED, and Cedar
Hills is GRANTED summary7 judgment as to the disconnection issue.

5.

Cedar Hills has agreed to stay the companion case for condemnation (which has
been consolidated into the present case but which was previously case number
010404045) in this matter pending appeal of the disconnection issue.
Accordingly, the companion claim by the Harveys against Cedar Hills for
constitutional rights violations (which has been consolidated into the present case
but which was previously case number 010404044) is also stayed pending appeal
of the disconnection issue.

6

Summary judgment in favor of Cedar Hills on the issue of disconnection is
certified as final and appealable
Dated this 3

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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10-4-1

CITIES AND TOWNS

Power to extend boundaries of municipal corporation, 64 A. L. R. 1335.

L a w Review,
Basis of Annexation of Territory by
Municipal Corporations, 21 Iowa L a w Review 128.

CHAPTER 4
RESTRICTION OP CORPORATE LIMITS
Section 10-4-1.
10-4-2.
10-4-3.
10-4-4.
10-4-5.

Disconnection b y petition to district court.
Court commissioners to adjust terms.
Commissioners' report.
Taxes to meet municipal obligations.
Decree—Filing—Costs—-When severance complete.

10-4-1. Disconnection by petition to district court.—Whenever a majority of the real property owners in territory within and lying upon the
borders of any incorporated city or town shall file with the clerk of the
district court of the county in which such territory lies a petition praying
that such territory be disconnected therefrom, and such petition sets forth
reasons why such territory should be disconnected from such city or town,
and is accompanied with a map or plat of the territory sought to be disconnected, and designates no more than five persons who are empowered
to act for such petitioners in such proceedings, the court shall cause a
notice of the filing of the same to be served upon said city or town in the
same manner as a summons in a civil action, and shall also cause notice
to be published for a period of ten days in some newspaper having general
circulation in such city or town. Issue shall be joined and the cause tried
as provided for the trial of civil causes as nearly as may be. The proper
authorities of such city or town, or any person interested in the subjectmatter of said petition, may appear and contest the granting of the same.
History: R. S. 1898 & O. I*. 1907,
§§288, 301; L. 1911, ch. 130, § 1 ; O. t,.
1917, §§771, 791; R. S. 1933 & O. 1943,
15-4-1.
,, _
, f
Comparable Provisions.
Idaho Code 1947, §50-2401 (boundaries
of city or village may be altered and
portion of territory thereof m a y be exeluded therefrom); § 50-2402 (petition to
be filed with clerk of city or viUage);
§ 50-2403 (council or board of trustees
may enact ordinance altering boundaries
or excluding t e r r i t o r y ) .
I o w a Code 1950, § 362.32 (territory m a y
be severed from any city or t o w n ; maj o r i t y of resident property owners may
bring suit in equity; court then appoints
commissioners).

ferred upon courts. I n re Fullmer, 33 IT.
43, 46, 92 P . 768, following Young v. Salt
L a k e City, 24 U. 321, 67 P . 1066. This
doctrine is re-affirmed in Plutus Min. Co.
v. Orme, 76 U. 286, 294, 289 P . 132 (rehearing denied).
The legislature m a y delegate to the
judiciary its a u t h o r i t y to restrict corporate limits of a city; therefore this
section is constitutional. But as changing
the territorial limits of a city is primarily
a legislative function, courts are bound to
confine the exercise of the power Conferred upon them b y the legislature within
the expressed or necessarily implied
language of the act so conferring such
power. P l u t u s Min. Co. v. Orme, 76 U.
286, 294, 289 P . 132.
2.

Cross-Reference.
Manner of serving summons, Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rules 4, 5 and 6.
1.

Constitutionality.
^
^
This section is valid as against claim
t h a t matters purely legislative are con-

Conditions precedent.
Authority to disconnect any territory
from the boundaries of an existing munieipality is based not only upon a compliance with this section, hut upon the
further essential requirement, prescribed
by 10-4-2, " t h a t justice and equity require
t h a t such t e r r i t o r y or any p a r t thereof
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*For the convenience of the Court, digital copies of the legislative floor debates have
been recorded on the same compact disc containing the electronic .pdf version of Brief of
Appellee.
House Floor Debate Recording for 2003 HB 98 recorded on February 6, 2003, also
available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?House=H (choose a2003
General Legislative Session", "Day 18 (2/6/2003)", "HB 0098").
Senate Floor Debate Recording for 2003 HB 98 recorded on February 19, 2003, also
available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?House^S (choose "2003
General Legislative Session", "Day 31 (2/19/2003)", "HB 0098").

